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In a macro-economic framework where the European Central Bank targets individual
country data, the nature of strategic interactions between fiscal authorities in the
euro-zone can be described as a stag hunt game with (at least) two equilibria that
can be pareto-ranked. In fact we show that, because of the indiscriminate nature of
its monetary response, an ECB strategy of monetary retaliation to any individual
country’s over-expenditure affects all eleven countries to the same extent. This
collective effect is similar to the teacher’s old favorite “all children stay behind in the
class if one misbehaves”. This mechanism, we show, makes the game between fiscal
authorities a multiple equilibria co-ordination game. We subsequently address the
problem of equilibrium selection that is of particular importance to co-ordination
games. Following Kandori et al. (1993), we apply Harsanyi and Selten’s (1988) risk-
dominance criterion to single out the conditions for fiscal restraint to emerge as the
equilibrium selected by interacting actors. Our main conclusions are that the ECB
can ensure convergence of fiscal authorities upon the pareto-optimal equilibrium
(that is, fiscal restraint) by adopting a reward-oriented, counter-cyclical strategy that
compensates fiscal authorities at the output level both for giving up fiscal discretion
and for incurring the risk of being hit by a monetary tightening in response to
developments elsewhere in the euro-economy. This means that interest rates'
movements should smoothen economic fluctuations in order to give economic actors
sufficient incentives to maintain restraint.
Zusammenfassung
In einem makroökonomischen Kontext, in dem die Europäische Zentralbank die
wirtschaftlichen Daten einzelner Länder anvisiert, können die strategischen
Interaktionen zwischen den Finanzbehörden der Euro-Zone als ein "stag hunt"- Spiel
mit (mindestens) zwei pareto-Equilibrien beschrieben werden. Wir zeigen daß,
aufgrund der ungezielten Art der monetären Reaktion, eine EZB-Strategie der
monetären Vergeltung für zu hohe Ausgaben eines einzelnen Landes alle elf Länder
gleichermaßen betrifft. Dieser Kollektiveffekt erinnert an die alte Lehrermethode:
"Alle Kinder müssen nachsitzen, wenn eins aus der Reihe tanzt." Dieser
Mechanismus macht das Spiel zwischen den Finanzbehörden zu einem
Koordinationsspiel mit mehreren Equilibrien. Anschließend befassen wir uns mit dem
in Koordinationsspielen besonders bedeutsamen Problem der Wahl zwischen
Equilibrien. In Anlehnung an Kandori et al. (1993) wenden wir Harsanyi und Selten's
(1988) Risikodominanzkriterium an, um die Bedingungen herauszufiltern, unter
denen fiskale Zurückhaltung das Equilibrium bildet, das von den beteiligten Akteuren
gewählt wird. Unsere wesentlichen Schlußfolgerungen sind, daß die EZB eine
Konvergenz der Finanzbehörden auf das pareto-optimale Equilibrium (d.h. fiskale
Zurückhaltung) sicherstellen kann, indem sie eine auf Belohnung ausgerichte,antizyklische Strategie verfolgt, bei der die Finanzbehörden auf der Output-Ebene
entschädigt werden -sowohl für die Abgabe fiskaler Entscheidungsfreiheit als auch
für das Risiko, einer monetären Kontraktion ausgesetzt zu werden, die auf
Entwicklungen anderswo in der Euro-Wirtschaft abzielt. Das bedeutet, daß
Zinsentwicklungen wirtschaftliche Fluktuationen ausgleichen sollten, um den
relevanten Akteuren ausreichende Anreize für fiskale Zurückhaltung zu bieten.Table of Contents
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1. Introduction
It is generally assumed that the ECB will target some Euro-wide aggregates to
determine its monetary policy. If indeed focused on euro-wide targets, the ECB’s
interactions with fiscal authorities and wage bargainers in the euro-zone resembles a
prisoner’s dilemma. EMU observers have therefore assumed that the ECB would
more or less emulate the Bundesbank’s role at the European level. Given the
multiplicity of sovereign fiscal decision-making authorities and the uncoordinated
nature of wage bargaining at the European level, no restraint/monetary punishment
establishes itself as the only equilibrium in this representation of the euro-zone’s
macro-economic game. The Stability Pact -  imposing binding fiscal targets  - is
generally advanced then as the solution to avoid being trapped in a bad equilibrium
of tight monetary policies and fiscal over-expenditure.
If, however, the ECB changes its strategy from targeting euro-wide aggregates
to individual country data, the nature of the strategic interactions between fiscal
authorities in the euro-zone can be shown to change into a stag hunt game with (at
least) two equilibria that can be pareto-ranked. In fact, because of the indiscriminate
nature of its monetary response, an ECB strategy of monetary retaliation to any
individual country’s misbehaviour  (i.e. deviation from fiscal restraint targets) affects
all eleven countries to the same extent. This collective effect is similar to the
teacher’s old favorite
1 “all children stay behind in the class if one misbehaves”. This
mechanism, we argue, makes the game between fiscal authorities a multiple
equilibria co-ordination game












                                           
1. We thank David Soskice for suggesting this very appropriate expression.
2  We focus in this paper on how the interactions between FAs are moderated by the ECB. However,
a similar argument applies to interactions among wage bargainers in the euro-zone and to
interactions between wage bargainers and fiscal authorities. They will all want to coordinate if the
ECB targets individual deviations because of the indiscriminate nature of monetary retaliation.2
V(..) being the fiscal authorities' loss functions and r0 < r1 the interest rates levels
corresponding respectively to restrained and unrestrained fiscal strategies.
Convergence upon both equilibrium solutions is possible, governments' overarching
priority being to act in accordance with the other governments. They may choose the
pareto-dominated equilibrium strategy not because of individual interests (as in the
prisoners' dilemma) but because of strategic uncertainty – they simply are not sure
what the other governments will do and some risk is therefore associated with
selecting the pareto-dominant equilibrium.
3 We claim that, in the above framework,
the ECB plays a crucial role by fixing the interest rate spread in such a way as to
help fiscal authorities choose among equilibrium solutions.
In the following sections we will show first why the above co-ordination problem
arises in interactions between fiscal authorities at the European level; we will
subsequently underline the main problems that this co-ordination dilemma generates
for the ECB, and propose possible solutions. We will address the problem of
equilibrium selection that is of particular importance to co-ordination games but has
received relatively little emphasis in game theory literature (Weber 1998). Following
Kandori et al. (1993), we apply the Harsanyi and Selten (1988) risk-dominance
criterion to single out the conditions for fiscal restraint to emerge as the equilibrium
selected by interacting actors. We will show that in order to implement fiscal restraint
in the proposed set-up of macro-economic interactions, requirements for the ECB
reaction function ought to be radically different from the ones that are generally
delivered in prisoners' dilemma analyses.
2. Fiscal authorities’ preferences and ECB reaction function
To define fiscal authorities’ loss function we take as our starting point a simple
Keynesian framework, where the fiscal authorities are interested in using fiscal
expenditure to minimise output deviation from its “equilibrium” level, in the presence
of negative (symmetric) shocks
4. In doing so they also take into consideration the
importance of budget restraint - that is, they also attach some negative value to
having fiscal expenditure different from the target level which can comfortably be
thought of as zero.
                                           
3  Strategic uncertainty arises even in situations where objectives, feasible strategies, and institutions
are completely specified and common knowledge (Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil, 1990)
4  At this stage, we have chosen to keep the model as simple as possible to present the main ideas
and arguments. In particular, we will only focus on symmetric shocks (leaving the asymmetric
shocks case for future research) and abstract from the role of cross-country spillovers whose
explicit consideration, although crucial in some contexts, is not necessary to our main purpose.3
Let  Y be output, g fiscal expenditure and R the real interest rate. Call the
equilibrium levels of output and the interest rate Y^ and R^. The relationship among
these variables is given by:
y = Y - Y^ = g - R - s + R^,  ￿ y = g - r - s,
where  s > 0 is a shock term, g  > <   0 is the deviation from the target for fiscal
expenditure and r > <   0 is the deviation from target of the real interest rate. Hence, we
can define fiscal restraint as a situation where g = 0.
Given the above definitions, the loss function for the FA can be written as
5:
V = y
2 + a g
2, with a>0.
The FA optimisation problem consists in choosing g to minimise the above loss
function:
min V = y
2 + a g
2.  (1)
g
Results from minimisation should then be compared to the alternative case where
fiscal restraint is implemented, that is g is simply set equal to zero.
Once the game is set up along the above lines, the crucial step is to define the
CB reaction function with respect to the fiscal authorities. We can approximate the
CB reaction function in the following way
6:
if ￿g = 0  then r = r0, (2)
r = r1 > max(r0 , 0)  otherwise.
This means that the CB fixes two different interest rate levels: r1 is the difference
between the maximum interest rate and the target level (and therefore generally
greater than zero), while r0 may be fixed either higher or lower than zero depending
on circumstances. Restrictions on r0 will actually come out as a result of the
equilibrium selection mechanism (see section 4 and 5). The maximum rate r1  is
chosen  if one country deviates from its target value of g, which also means that the
minimum interest rate is implemented only if all countries stick to fiscal restraint, no
one excepted.
                                           
5 This  loss  function  has  also  been  used by Bessone Basto (s.d.).
6  For simplicity, we will assume in what follows that the countries playing the game we analyze are
large enough, so that a deviation by these countries is sufficient to trigger the reaction of the ECB.4
In this framework, the CB acts as an external actor (with respect to the game
among fiscal authorities) that automatically sets the interest rate at the level required
by the outcome of the interactions among FAs. This role is crucial, since it allows the
CB to fix the interest rate spread in such a way as to force fiscal actors to implement
different equilibrium solutions. The next step then is to determine which conditions
must be met by the interest rate spread in order for fiscal/wage restraint to emerge
as an equilibrium and subsequently be selected by interacting actors.
3. The co-ordination game among fiscal authorities
A FA faces the following choice. If all FA accept fiscal restraint, then g = 0 and r is
set at its low level (r0), leading to the following ex-post value of the loss function:
V0 = V(g=0 and r=r0) = (s + r0)
2. The corresponding output value is y0 = - (s + r0).
Alternatively, a FA may not accept fiscal restraint, and choose g by minimising the
loss function above (V). As a consequence, the interest rate is set at its high level
(r1). Recalling the optimisation problem in (1), the optimal choice is given by:
dV/dg = g (1+a) - r1 - s = 0 (3)
which implies that fiscal expenditure is given by g1 =  1/(1+a) (r1 + s) and the
corresponding output value is y1 = - a/(1+a) (s + r1).
The FA that moves away from fiscal restraint obtains:
V1 = a/(1+a) (r1 + s)
2 (4)
while the loss of the restrained FA facing the above deviatory FA is:
V^ = V(g=0 and r=r1) = (s + r1)
2. (5)
It is straightforward to check that  V^ > V1 . Hence, the game among FA can be




Restraint V0 V^, V1
No restraint V1, V^ V1
(table 2)
In order for fiscal restraint to be an equilibrium solution in the above game the
following condition should be met: V1 t V0. If this is the case, then the game has two
different equilibrium solutions, namely V1 and V0: if either one of the two countries is
deviating, then both are better off deviating, while if the two pursue fiscal restraint
they both benefit from it.
Since both V1 as well as V0 values depend on interest rates levels, the CB has a
crucial role to play in establishing the conditions for the above inequality to hold. In
particular, it is clear that if r1 = r0 then V1 < V0  and fiscal restraint is not an
equilibrium strategy.
We study the required behaviour of the CB in section 4 below. However it
should be stressed that, once the above condition is satisfied, it just ensures that
restraint is one equilibrium solution in the game but by no means that it will be
ultimately selected by FA. The issue of equilibrium selection is particularly important
in co-ordination games and we will treat this problem in section 5.
4. Is restraint one equilibrium solution? Two possible scenarios
We consider now how the CB can ensure that fiscal restraint is indeed an
equilibrium solution for the above FA game. To do this we compare the ex-post loss
function values V1 and V0, and make sure that the following condition is met:
(r0 + s)
2 < (r1 + s)
2 a/(a+1) (6)
which basically means ensuring: (y0)
2 < (y1)
2 (a+1)/a. Hence, fiscal restraint is an
equilibrium solution in the FA game if the magnitude of output deviation associated
with fiscal restraint is lower than the one associated with the alternative unrestrained
(optimal) fiscal choice. This implies considering different economic scenarios
concerning the value of output under respectively an unrestrained and a restrained6
fiscal strategy. Recalling that we previously assumed r1 t max(0, r0), the following
cases should be analysed 
7:
y1 t 0
s d  - r1
y1 d 0
s t - r1
y0 t 0,
s d  - r0
case 1 case 2
y0 d 0,
s t - r0
case 4 case 3
(table 3)
This leaves us with two alternative scenarios, namely case 2 and 3. In case 3, the
CB is unable and/or unwilling to entirely compensate the adverse shock term, thus
the minimum interest rate value is such that s > - r 0 (and clearly s > - r 1) and the
economy is in a recessionary scenario (both y0 d 0 and y1 d 0). In the alternative
case 2 scenario, recovery is possible (that is, y0 t 0 vs. y1 d 0) because the minimum
interest rate value is such that 
8: - r0 > s >  - r1.
Let us analyse what the CB should do in each of the two scenarios above, in
order to make sure that fiscal restraint is indeed an equilibrium in the co-ordination
game.
￿ CASE 3 (recession vs. recession ￿ r0 and r1 > -s)
One can easily show that, for V1 t V0 to hold, the following condition for interest rate
spread must be met
9:
(-s <) r0 < A r1 - s/(1+a) = r^,  with:  r^ > <   0  ￿  r1 > <   s/a.
This means in particular that the minimum interest rate value must be set by the CB
according to the following rule: r0 < r^  > <   0.
￿ CASE 2 (recovery vs. recession  ￿ - r0 > s > - r1)
For V1 t V0 to hold in this case, the condition for interest rate spread should be:
(-s >) r0 > - A r1 - (A+1) s,
                                           
7  Note that case 4 must be excluded because of the assumption that r1 is at least as large as r0, and
case 1 because of the assumption that r1 > 0.
8  Notice that for case 2 to be possible the minimum interest rate ought to be negative (that is below
target).
9 We  define  A = a/(1+a).7
which basically fixes the lower boundary for the (negative) minimum interest rate
value necessary for the CB to foster economic recovery without neglecting
restraining incentives.
The main conclusions that can be drawn from the above analysis are that, in the
presence of adverse shocks to the economy, the CB should fix the minimum interest
rate level in response to the strength of the shock term. In fact, in order for fiscal
restraint to be one equilibrium solution in the game among FA, the CB should fix the
interest rate so as to (at least partially) offset output deviation (from the equilibrium
value) in order to compensate fiscal authorities for giving up their fiscal discretion. If
this is not the case, the co-ordination game set-up disappears and the unique
solution left is the unrestrained equilibrium. In particular, in a recessionary scenario
(case 3) where interest rate movement does not fully compensate adverse shocks,
the minimum interest rate should be fixed close/below target value. Moreover, in a
recovery scenario (case 2) where interest rate movements fully compensate adverse
shocks, the minimum interest rate should be negative but not too low. However,
results derived in this section are only preliminary since they must be checked in the
light of the equilibrium selection analysis that follows.
5. Is restraint the selected equilibrium solution? The need for a
symmetric ECB reaction function
In the co-ordination game context that we have being discussing so far, two different
Nash equilibria coexist. We need to find a mechanism that determines which of the
equilibria the actors ultimately converge upon. Kandori et al. (1993) show that the
selected equilibrium in a co-ordination game is generally the risk-dominant
equilibrium (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). The criterion of risk-dominance allows
actors to minimise the possible risk associated with their equilibrium strategy, that is
the uncertainty concerning other actors’ behaviour (in our case, the possible
outcome loss coming from indiscriminatory CB retaliation in reaction to the other FA
unrestrained fiscal behaviour).
For the co-ordination games modelled above, the criterion of risk dominance
indicates that for the pareto-dominant equilibrium V0 to be selected, the following
should hold:
V0 - V1 < V1 - V^ (7)
We conclude that holding V0 < V1  (as we have done so far) is not in itself sufficient
for the fiscal restraint equilibrium to be chosen. This result comes from the CB
behaving according to what we described in the introduction as the old teacher’s8
favourite “all children stay behind in the class if one misbehaves”. In fact, if the
outcome loss from behaving correctly when the others do not (namely, -V1) is too
high, then the selected equilibrium according to the risk-dominance criterion will be
the pareto-dominated one (namely, V1) meaning that actors will converge upon the
unrestrained fiscal solution.
Substituting for the loss function values in our model we can rewrite the
condition (7) in the following form:
(r0 + s)
2 < (r1 + s)
2 (a-1)/(a+1), (8)
which is clearly more restrictive than condition (6) above. Inequality (8) only makes
sense if a > 1. Let us assume that this is the case 
10.
Solving the above inequality with respect to the economic scenarios of recession
and recovery, we find that the conditions for the interest rate spread are as follows:
￿ CASE 3 (recession vs. recession ￿ r0 and r1 > -s)
For the risk-dominance condition to hold, the interest rate spread should be fixed
according to the following 
11:
(-s <) r0 < Ac r1 - 2s/(1+a) = r*,
with:  r* > <   0  ￿  r1 > <   2s /(a-1),
which is similar, but much stricter than the condition derived in the previous section.
Again, the minimum interest rate value should be set by the CB according to the
following rule: r0 < r* > <   0.
￿ CASE 2 (recovery vs. recession  ￿ - r0 > s > - r1)
For the risk-dominance condition to hold in this case, the condition for interest rate
spread should be:
(-s >) r0 > - Ac r1 - (Ac+1) s,
                                           
10  This means that a strong commitment by fiscal authorities to fiscal restraint is necessary (though
not sufficient) for restraint to be the (possible) selected equilibrium outcome of the co-ordination
game.
11 We  define  Ac = (a-1)/(1+a).9
which fixes a lower boundary for the (negative) minimum interest rate value
necessary for the CB to secure economic recovery together with restraining
incentives.
Hence, the analysis of equilibrium selection reinforces the results previously
derived for the existence of a fiscal restraint equilibrium. In fact, fulfilment of the risk-
dominance criterion for the fiscal restraint equilibrium requires that the CB fixes
interest rate so as to compensate fiscal authorities both for giving up fiscal discretion
and for incurring the risk of being “left behind in class if one other misbehaves”. In
order to do that, CB intervention to offset output deviation should be stronger than
required in the previous section. This means that in the recessionary scenario (case
3) the minimum interest rate should be fixed according to r0 < r* < r^; and that in the
recovery scenario (case 2) the minimum interest rate should be negative but not too
low.
Hence, we can conclude that: first that interest rates should be lowered in case
of negative shocks in order to make co-ordination on fiscal restraint ultimately
possible; and second, that the ECB should indeed adopt a pro-active, symmetric
reaction function similar to the one employed by the Federal Reserve 
12. Hence, to
reap the benefits from co-ordination between fiscal authorities on restraint, we
conclude that the ECB should not limit itself to a reactive punishment. Suitable
rewards should accompany it and may indeed ensure that Europe’s macro-economic
game to converge on the fiscal restraint, low interest rates equilibrium.
6. Conclusions
Our analysis shows that, for the fiscal restraint equilibrium to be the selected
equilibrium outcome in the co-ordination game between fiscal authorities,
institutional preconditions (such as agreement upon target values and/or strong
commitment to restraint) are necessary but by far not sufficient.
As we have shown, the ECB can ensure convergence of fiscal authorities upon
the pareto-optimal equilibrium (that is, fiscal restraint) by adopting a reward-oriented,
counter-cyclical strategy that compensates fiscal authorities, at the output level, both
for giving up fiscal discretion and for incurring the risk of being “left behind in class if
one other misbehaves”. This means that interest rates' movements should smoothen
economic fluctuations in order to give economic actors sufficient incentives to
maintain restraint.
                                           
12  Hence, our analysis supports the views recently expressed by a.o. Allsopp and Vines 1998, and
Soskice 1999.10
In that sense, the very rationale for subscribing to the Stability Pact is
undermined when the ECB is not willing – because of its focus on an inflation
increase - , or not able – because of developments elsewhere in the economy,
notably the wage bargaining system -, to pick up the signal of restraint and respond
with looser monetary policies.
By proposing an alternative strategy for the ECB monetary rules (targeting
individual country behaviour rather than euro-wide aggregates) our analysis has
shown that a self-enforcing equilibrium of fiscal restraint in the euro-zone exists. If
suitably rewarded, that is to say, with the ECB adopting a transparent, symmetric
reaction function, fiscal authorities will indeed adopt fiscal restraint in their own
interest.11
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